Efficient mechanism for aggregate demand prediction in the smart grid by Egri, Péter & Váncza, József
Efficient Mechanism for Aggregate Demand
Prediction in the Smart Grid
Pe´ter Egri1 and Jo´zsef Va´ncza1,2
1 Fraunhofer Project Center for Production Management and Informatics
Institute for Computer Science and Control
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Kende u. 13-17, 1111 Budapest, Hungary
2 Department of Manufacturing Science and Technology
Budapest University of Technology and Economics
H-1111 Budapest, Egry Jo´zsef u. 1., Hungary
{egri,vancza}@sztaki.mta.hu
Abstract. This paper studies an aggregate demand prediction problem
relevant in smart grids. In our model, an aggregator agent is responsi-
ble for eliciting the demand forecasts of a number of self-interested home
agents and purchasing electricity for them. Forecasts are given in form of
probability distributions, and generating them incurs costs proportional
to their precision. The paper presents a novel scoring rule based mecha-
nism which not only makes the agents interested in reporting truthfully,
but also inspires them to achieve the socially optimal forecast precision.
Hence, the aggregator agent is then able to optimise the total expected
cost of electricity supply. Therefore the mechanism becomes efficient,
contrarily to prior works in this field. Empirical studies show that it is
beneficial to join to the mechanism compared to purchasing electricity
directly from the market, even if the mechanism consists only of a few
agents.
Keywords: Smart grid, distributed optimisation, information aggrega-
tion, mechanism design, scoring rules
1 Introduction
In the energy sector, supplies are meticulously provided so as to meet projected
loads. On the one hand, when actual demand exceeds supply, the response is
to use increasingly expensive energy generation sources, and, in the last resort,
to decrease load (e.g., through brownouts and blackouts). On the other hand,
overproduction of energy incurs severe extra costs, too. The resolution relies
heavily on multiplexing a set of loads in order to smooth the aggregate demand
which is formed from information provided by local individual users of energy [1].
This coupling of energy and information flows is the basis of smart grids.
The paper discusses an aggregate demand prediction model where self-in-
terested home agents can produce electricity demand forecasts at a certain cost.
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The independent agents report the forecasts to an aggregator agent that is re-
sponsible for meeting the actual total demand. While the system as a whole
could operate most efficiently if the home agents would invest into making pre-
cise enough forecasts and share this information truthfully with the aggregator,
in a system of self-interested agents there is no warranty for such a behaviour.
Why would not take any home agent a free rider’s stance and neglect forecast-
ing? And why would it report its unbiased private forecast when it wants to
make sure its demand will be met by the electricity supply? How could agents
be made interested in putting effort into generating their own, sufficiently precise
demand forecasts? What an incentive system could warrant truthful communica-
tion of these forecast information? In general, can any coordination mechanism
facilitate the better (i.e., cheaper, more profitable, more stable) behaviour of
the system as a whole than the simple aggregation of the individual operations?
Why would it pay off for any agent to participate in such a system instead of
going for the satisfaction of its own demand directly?
This problem setting is relevant in any domain where demand and supply has
to be matched by autonomous partners who have asymmetric information and
responsibilities, and where the satisfaction of aggregate, uncertain demand may
incur lower costs (or higher profits) than meeting individual demands apiece. For
instance, it may mitigate risks implied by market volatility as well as decrease
total production and logistics costs in supply networks where a supplier is serving
different retailers of the same product [2].
We investigate the above issues by means of the apparatus of mechanism
design. Mechanism design, also considered inverse game theory, has a specific
engineering perspective: it applies the model of non-cooperative games with
agents having incomplete information, and investigates how the private infor-
mation influencing the other agents’ utilities can be elicited [3]. Thanks to this
generic approach, beyond elaborating a complex—communication, decision and
financial transaction—mechanism we can also prove some key properties of this
inherently distributed system that are prerequisites of any real application.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we re-
view related works, then in Section 3 present the demand prediction and decision
making model, and derive its optimal solution in a cooperative, social welfare
maximising setting. In Section 4 the proposed mechanism is presented together
with the proofs of its main properties in the non-cooperative case. Numerical
illustrations of the system behaviour is shown in Section 5. Finally, the paper
concludes in Section 6.
2 Literature Review
The information elicitation or prediction mechanism design problem, which has
recently come into the focus also of the multiagent research, consists of several
agents with some private information about the probability of some stochastic
future event, and a centre whose goal is to obtain and aggregate the dispersed
information [4, 5]. There are two different kinds of such models: the peer predic-
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tion systems and the prediction markets. In the former one, the outcome (event)
is subjective or unmeasurable, therefore it cannot be used as a basis for evalu-
ating the forecasts posteriorly. In such cases, the predictions of the agents can
be compared to other agents’ forecasts only.
In prediction markets however, which are in our main focus from now on,
there is always a clear, objective outcome. Such problems can be handled by
applying the so-called strictly proper scoring rules that we briefly define here.
Let us assume a set D of possible events, and P, a class of probability measures
over them. A scoring rule S : P ×D → IR is called strictly proper, if whenever
an event ξ ∈ D is drawn from the distribution θ ∈ P, then for any other θˆ 6=
θ : Eθ[S(θ, ξ)] < Eθ[S(θˆ, ξ)]. With other words, the score can be minimised (in
expectation), if it is parametrised with the real distribution of the stochastic
event.3 Well-studied examples for strictly proper scoring rules are the quadratic,
the spherical and the logarithmic rules, see e.g., [4]. Applying such rules to the
information elicitation problem is straightforward: if the agent with the private
information is penalized proportionally to a proper score, it becomes interested
in creating and providing as good a forecast as possible.
Note that it is implicitly assumed in these models that the forecast can be
generated free of charge; when generating or improving the forecast involves
some cost, truthful mechanisms may not exist in general [4]. However, there ex-
ist some cases when costly forecasts can be successfully included into the model.
For example, in [6] several agents can provide forecasts for the same stochas-
tic variable at different costs, and the authors present a two-stage mechanism
including a reverse second-price auction for solving the information elicitation
problem in this case.
Apart from the costly forecast generation, there are several other extensions
of the information elicitation problem. In some models, the agents have interests
in the decision of the centre, therefore they might disclose false information in
order to manipulate the decision maker. Such situation is considered e.g., in
[2], where the logistic decisions of a supplier can cause shortages at the retailers,
which affects their profits. Further difficulties occur, when the objective function
of the agents are not known exactly, or when the agents can manipulate the
outcome and therefore influence the evaluation of their reported forecasts.
Information elicitation problems appear in smart grids, which intend to com-
bine modern communication technology with the electricity network. In order
to level fluctuations and optimise the generation, distribution and utilisation of
electricity, the recent advances in hardware technology should be supplemented
with novel software support of automation and control, as well as business mod-
els [7]. The so-called “smart meters” for example, that measure not only the
electricity usage, but also record the time of the consumption, enable the intro-
duction of time-differentiated pricing. Exploiting the price-responsive demand,
this instrument can be applied as a tool for aligning the demand with the sup-
ply of fluctuating renewable energy sources (e.g., wind, solar) in the smart grids.
The bidirectional communication also enables that utility companies can collect
3 Note that in contrast to the usual notation, for convenience, we minimize the score.
4 Pe´ter Egri and Jo´zsef Va´ncza
and analyse more detailed and precise information generated by agent-based
forecasting at household level [8].
In [9] an aggregate demand prediction model is presented for the smart grid,
where an aggregator agent elicits consumption forecasts from the home agents
and purchases electricity for them. The authors present a scoring rule based
mechanism that fairly distributes the savings among the agents, and prove its
individual rationality, incentive compatibility and ex ante weak budget balance
properties (for formal definitions, see later). However, incentive compatibility in
that paper relates only to the truthful reporting of forecasts, their precision is
usually not globally optimal, therefore the mechanism is not efficient. In addition,
the mechanism has to artificially limit the accepted precision from the agents,
thus even the optimal solution could be excluded.
A structurally similar model for supply networks is presented in [10]. In that
paper a supplier collects demand forecasts from retailers, and provides a Vendor
Managed Inventory (VMI) service for them. The model completely disregards
the costs of forecasting, and presents a mechanism that is incentive compatible
and efficient, but individual rationality is not discussed.
In general, the operations research literature provides several analytical mod-
els for optimisation of decision making in the above setting. The model in this
paper applies a specialised version of the single-period stochastic lot-sizing prob-
lem, the so-called newsvendor model [11]. Since this assumes already given fore-
casts, the costly forecasting should be included into the model by comparing the
cost and the benefit of generating an estimate with a given precision. For this
problem, the value of information (VOI) approach can be applied [12].
It is not unprecedented in the literature to apply coordination contracts in the
electricity industry originally developed for supply chain inventory management.
In [13] different contractual forms and market structures are investigated for
dampening the double marginalisation effect, i.e., when the rational decisions of
self-interested decision makers lead to a non-Pareto optimal equilibrium. The
problem is illustrated through a case study of the Spanish electricity market,
where the demand can be fulfilled either from the futures (forward) market
in advance, or promptly from the spot (balancing) market. In that paper, the
demand is not stochastic but price-dependent, therefore the price can be used
to balance demand with supply.
A related study can be found in [14], which focuses on the energy resources
instead of consumption. The authors present a model and incentive mechanism
for aggregating electricity production from distributed energy resources. In their
model the estimation is characterised by the expected value only, which is later
compared to the realised production, therefore no scoring rules are required.
In this paper we consider a similar model as in [9], but contrarily, our mech-
anism is efficient, does not bind the accepted precision, and inspires the home
agents to generate the optimally precise forecasts. The presented mechanism is
based on the scoring rule introduced in [10], but it is extended to consider the
costly forecast generation. Furthermore, we prove additional properties of the
mechanism in the discussed model like individual rationality and ex ante strong
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budget balance. Since the proposed transfer function of agent i does not depend
on other agents’ forecasts or demands, it evaluates only the correctness of agent
i’s estimation, in this sense it can be considered fair, and provides the privacy
of the consumption data.
3 Model
We assume n home agents and an aggregator agent who collects forecasts about
the future consumption of the homes, and purchases electricity for them (see
Fig. 1). Each day is divided into a number of periods, and for each period a
home agent can generate demand forecast at a cost proportional to the forecast
precision. From now on, we consider only one period, since the problems for
different periods are independent from each other.
Aggregator agentHome agents Electricity markets
Fig. 1. Electricity network.
We assume that the forecast of agent i ∈ [1, n] is represented by a normal
distribution with mean mi and standard deviation σi. This forecast can be gener-
ated at price p(σi) = α/σ
2
i , where 1/σ
2
i is the so-called precision of the forecast,
and α > 0 is a constant. Note that we assume that the price function is the same
for all agents.
It is also assumed that the consumptions at the homes are independent from
each other, therefore the aggregate forecast of the total consumption will also
be normally distributed with mean m =
∑n
i=1mi and σ =
√∑n
i=1 σ
2
i .
The aggregator agent decides about the purchase quantity q that is bought on
the forward market at price c. During the period, agent i consumes ξi electricity,
and if the total realized consumption ξ =
∑n
i=1 ξi is less or equal than the
quantity bought on the forward market, the aggregator can provide the necessary
electricity. However, if ξ > q, the aggregator has to buy additional electricity on
the balancing market at buy price b. On the other hand, if ξ < q, the surplus
can be sold there at sell price s. It is natural to assume the following relation
between the different prices: b > c > s.
In the following two subsections we study the social welfare maximising so-
lution in the centralised model considering cooperative agents. The resulted de-
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cision problem has two stages: in the first stage the optimal forecast precisions,
while in the second stage the optimal purchase quantity is computed. We solve
the problem in a backward induction manner: firstly, we determine the optimal
q assuming a given forecast with a special form of the newsvendor model, then
we derive the optimal forecast precision.
3.1 Optimal Purchase Quantity in the Cooperative Case
In this subsection we consider the normally distributed total consumption ξ ∼
N (m,σ), and denote its probability and cumulative distribution functions with
φ and Φ, respectively. If the aggregator purchases quantity q, its resulted revenue
will be −cq−bmax(ξ−q, 0)+smax(q−ξ, 0), i.e., the payment for the electricity
on the forward market and the (negative or positive) payment of matching supply
and demand on the balancing market. The expected value of this, which we call
valuation, can be expressed in the following form:
v(q) = −cq − bE[max(ξ − q, 0)] + sE[max(q − ξ, 0)]
= −cq − b
∫ ∞
q
(x− q)φ(x)dx+ s
∫ q
−∞
(q − x)φ(x)dx
= −cq − b
(∫ ∞
q
xφ(x)dx− q
∫ ∞
q
φ(x)dx
)
+s
(
q
∫ q
−∞
φ(x)dx−
∫ q
−∞
xφ(x)dx
)
= −cq − b
(
m−
∫ q
−∞
xφ(x)dx− q (1− Φ(x))
)
+s
(
qΦ(x)−
∫ q
−∞
xφ(x)dx
)
= −cq + b(q −m) + (b− s)
(∫ q
−∞
xφ(x)dx− qΦ(q)
)
. (1)
Since the valuation function is concave (v′′(q) = −(b − s)φ(q) ≤ 0), the
optimal q∗ can be determined by the first derivative test
v′(q∗) = b− c− (b− s)Φ(q∗) = 0 , (2)
which results in
q∗ = Φ−1
(
b− c
b− s
)
= m+ σ
√
2 erf−1
(
b− 2c+ s
b− s
)
, (3)
where
erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt , (4)
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is the Gauss error function and erf−1(x) denotes its inverse. The valuation using
the optimal purchase quantity can then be expressed by substituting (3) into (1)
as
v∗(σ) := v(q∗) = −cm− σKcbs , (5)
where
Kcbs =
(b− s)e−
(
erf−1( b−2c+sb−s )
)2
√
2pi
. (6)
Note that Kcbs depends only on the cost parameters c, b and s.
3.2 Optimal Forecast Precision in the Cooperative Case
We now examine the optimal forecast precisions, or equivalently, the optimal
standard deviations. Since we assume that the price function of the forecast
generation is the same at every agent (p(σi) = α/σ
2
i ), it follows that in the
optimal solution each σi is the same (σi = σj , ∀i, j ∈ [1, n]) and therefore
σ =
√∑n
i=1 σ
2
i =
√
nσi.
The utility will be the valuation minus the forecasting price of the n agents:
U(σi) = v
∗(σ)− np(σi) = −cm−
√
nσiKcbs − n α
σ2i
. (7)
This utility function is concave too (U ′′(σi) = −6nα/(σi)4 ≤ 0), therefore
the optimal standard deviation can be determined by
U ′(σ∗i ) = 2nα/(σ
∗
i )
3 −√nKcbs = 0 , (8)
which results in
σ∗i =
3
√
2
√
nα
Kcbs
. (9)
The optimal forecast precision in function of the number of the home agents
is illustrated on Fig. 2.
4 Non-Cooperative Mechanism
In this section we consider a non-cooperative setting, where each agent max-
imises its own utility. A home agent has two decisions: about the precision of the
generated forecast (σi), and the values of the reported forecast (mˆi, σˆi), while
the aggregator decides about the purchased quantity (q). The mechanism in this
case is characterised by a transfer function or payment ti(mˆi, σˆi, ξi) that has
to be paid by agent i to the aggregator after the consumption ξi is realised.
The transfer function should depend only on commonly known parameters and
independent from the privately known mi and σi.
We are looking for a mechanism that is realized by such a transfer function
that fulfils the following four key properties:
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– It has incentive compatibility that implies in this case two things: (i) the home
agents create optimally precise forecasts, and (ii) they report the forecasts
to the aggregator truthfully, if they want to maximise their utility.
– The mechanism is efficient, i.e., the aggregator agent purchases the optimal
quantity of electricity from the market.
– The mechanism is individually rational, i.e., the utility of the home agents are
not less than their utility without the mechanism (when purchasing directly
from the market).
– Finally, it is budget balanced meaning that the mechanism does not run into
deficit or surplus, or in other words, the utility of the aggregator is zero.
We assume that the market prices c, b and s are common knowledge, since the
home agents can buy directly from the market if they do not join the mechanism.
We suggest the same transfer function that we developed for coordinating supply
chains, that consists of two terms: (i) the payment for the purchased electricity,
and (ii) a penalty for the forecast error, based on a scoring rule [10]:
ti(mˆi, σˆi, ξi) = cξi + γ
(
(ξi − mˆi)2
σˆi
+ σˆi
)
, (10)
where mˆi and σˆi are the communicated forecast of agent i, ξi is its realised
consumption, while γ is a positive constant. As we shall soon see, in order to
achieve the four required properties stated above, γ cannot be arbitrary, but it
should assume a specific value.
It is worth noting that the payment (10) is very similar to the classical
logarithmic scoring rule, which can be determined as the negated logarithm of
the probability density function of the communicated forecast, i.e., in case of the
normal distribution, it is the following
ln 2pi
2
+
(
(ξi − mˆi)2
2σˆ2i
+ ln σˆi
)
. (11)
It is well known that a positive affine transformation of a strictly proper
scoring rule remains strictly proper [4], but in spite of the similarities, these two
scoring rules are not affine transformations of each other.
In what follows we examine one by one whether and how the non-cooperative
mechanism exhibits the basic properties required above.
4.1 Incentive Compatibility
In the first phase the home agents generate forecasts mi and σi, next, they report
the forecasts to the aggregator agent in the centre. Let us first examine the latter
phase with generated forecast (mi, σi), reported forecast (mˆi, σˆi), and realized
demand ξi. Note that at this point since p(σi) has been already invested in the
forecast, we consider only the expected payment here.
Theorem 1. The unique optimal solution for minimising the expected payment
is mˆi = mi and σˆi = σi, therefore the home agents are inspired to report the
forecasts truthfully.
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Proof. The expected payment is
E[ti(mˆi, σˆi, ξi)] = cE [ξi] + γE
[
(ξi − mˆi)2
σˆi
+ σˆi
]
= cmi + γE
[
ξ2i + mˆ
2
i − 2mˆiξi
σˆi
+ σˆi
]
= cmi + γ
E
[
ξ2i
]
+ mˆ2i − 2mˆiE[ξi]
σˆi
+ σˆi
= cmi + γ
(
m2i + σ
2
i + mˆ
2
i − 2mˆimi
σˆi
+ σˆi
)
, (12)
where we have applied the identity E
[
ξ2i
]
= m2i + σ
2
i . The partial derivative of
the expected payment by mˆi is
∂E[ti(mˆi, σˆi, ξi)]
∂mˆi
= γ
(
2mˆi − 2mi
σˆi
)
, (13)
which equals zero iff mˆi = mi, independently from the value of σˆi. This yields
the minimum, since the expected payment is convex in mˆi:
∂2E[ti(mˆi, σˆi, ξi)]
∂mˆ2i
= γ
(
2
σˆi
)
≥ 0 . (14)
For calculating the other partial derivative, we already exploit that mˆi = mi:
∂E[ti(mi, σˆi, ξi)]
∂σˆi
= γ
(
−σ
2
i
σˆ2i
+ 1
)
, (15)
which equals zero iff σˆi = σi, which is the minimum, since the expected payment
is convex also in σˆi:
∂2E[ti(mi, σˆi, ξi)]
∂σˆ2i
= γ
σ2i
σˆ3i
≥ 0 . (16)
uunionsq
Let us now examine the first phase knowing that later the forecasts will be
reported truthfully. In this case, the expected payment can be derived from (12):
E[ti(mi, σi, ξi)] = cmi + 2γσi, thus the utility of agent i becomes:
Ui(σi) = −E[ti(mi, σi, ξi)]− p(σi) = −cmi − 2γσi − α
σ2i
. (17)
Since the utility is concave in σi (U
′′
i (σi) = −6α/(σi)4 ≤ 0), the optimal
standard deviation can be determined by U ′i(σ
∗
i ) = −2γ + 2α/(σ∗i )3 = 0, which
yields
σ∗i = 3
√
α
γ
, (18)
therefore using γ = Kcbs
2
√
n
results in the the optimal forecast precision of (9).
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4.2 Efficiency
The utility of the aggregator will be the collected transfer payments minus the
price of the electricity bought, plus the price of the electricity eventually sold—
this last two items are summed up by the valuation (1), i.e.,
Ua(q) = E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(mi, σi, ξi)
]
+ v(q) . (19)
Since the first term is independent from the decision variable q, thus the ag-
gregator intends to maximise the valuation that results in the optimal quantity
derived in (3). Hence, the system as a whole meets the demand of home agents
in expectation at the lowest possible total price of electricity.
4.3 Individual Rationality
Without the mechanism, home agent i would generate its forecast and buy the
electricity directly from the forward and balancing markets. Now we investigate
if any home agent i could be better off without joining to the mechanism. Let
qi denote the quantity bought on the forward market, then analogously to the
derivation of Section 3.1, its revenue become −cqi−bmax(ξi−qi, 0)+smax(qi−
ξi, 0), and its expected value
vi(qi) = −cqi + b(qi −mi) + (b− s)
(∫ qi
−∞
xφi(x)dx− qiΦi(qi)
)
, (20)
where φi and Φi are the probability and cumulative distribution functions of ξi,
respectively. This yields an optimal purchase quantity
q∗i = mi + σi
√
2 erf−1
(
b− 2c+ s
b− s
)
, (21)
and
v∗i (σi) := vi(q
∗
i ) = −cmi − σiKcbs . (22)
Then the optimal forecast precision can be derived analogously to Section
3.2 using
U¯i(σi) = v
∗
i (σi)− p(σi) = −cmi − σiKcbs −
α
σ2i
: (23)
σ¯∗i =
3
√
2α
Kcbs
. (24)
All in all, the utility of agent i without the mechanism is
U¯i(σ¯
∗
i ) = v
∗
i (σ¯
∗
i )− p(σ¯∗i ) = −cmi − σ¯∗iKcbs − p(σ¯∗i )
= −cmi − 33√4
3
√
αK2cbs . (25)
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However, by using the mechanism (9) and (17) are valid, thus
Ui(σ
∗
i ) = −E[ti(mi, σ∗i , ξi)]− p(σ∗i )
= −cmi − 33√4n
3
√
αK2cbs , (26)
and comparing (25) and (26) shows that Ui(σ
∗
i ) > U¯i(σ¯
∗
i ) (if n > 1), i.e., the util-
ity using the mechanism is always greater than without the mechanism. Hence,
the home agents have an incentive to use the service of the demand aggregator
mechanism when meeting their individual demand for electricity.
4.4 Budget Balance
The utility of the aggregator can be computed substituting (3), (5), (9) into (19):
Ua(q
∗) = E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(mi, σ
∗
i , ξi)
]
+ v∗(σ∗)
= nE [ti(mi, σ∗i , ξi)]− cm−
√
nσ∗iKcbs
= n (cmi + 2γσ
∗
i )− cm−
√
nσ∗iKcbs
= cm+ 2nγσ∗i − cm−
√
nσ∗iKcbs = 2nγσ
∗
i −
√
nσ∗iKcbs
= 2n
Kcbs
2
√
n
3
√
2
√
nα
Kcbs
−√n 3
√
2
√
nα
Kcbs
Kcbs = 0 , (27)
thus the mechanism is ex ante (in expectation) budget balanced. In other words,
no payments or debts are accumulated at the aggregator agent.
5 Computational Study
In this section we illustrate the properties of the mechanism on a specific numer-
ical example and simulation runs. We apply the same experimental set-up as in
[9], i.e., we set c = 100, b = 170, s = 50 and α = 20. Fig. 2 shows the optimal
forecast precision as the number of home agents increases. It can be observed
that as more and more agents join the mechanism, the required precision—thus
the forecasting cost—considerably decreases.
Fig. 3 plots the expected and the simulated average utility of the home agents,
where the expected demand (mi) for each agent is uniformly distributed in the
interval [30, 50]. Each value is an average of 1000 simulation runs, while the
expected cost curve is given by (26).
The previous two figures point out that the largest marginal gain joining
the mechanism is achieved when there are only few agents in the mechanism
already. This means that although joining a larger coalition is always better
than joining a smaller, but only slightly. In other words, a lot of independent
mechanisms with relatively small number of homes are almost as economical
as a single mechanism with all the agents. It is an interesting property that a
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20 40 60 80 100
n
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1
IΣi*M
2
Fig. 2. Required forecast precision.
20 40 60 80 100
n
-4040
-4030
-4020
-4010
U
Fig. 3. Average utility of the home agents (simulated and expected).
200 400 600 800 1000
t
-15 000
-10 000
-5000
5000
U
Fig. 4. Cumulated utility of the aggregator with 100 agents as time progresses.
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mechanism with more home agents can achieve better performance, even when
the forecasts are less precise.
Fig. 4 shows the simulated cumulative utility of the aggregator agent. Al-
though its expected value is zero as it was proved, its realised value can be
arbitrary, oscillating around zero.
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
c
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
1
IΣi*M
2
Fig. 5. Required forecast precision as cost parameters increase.
In a smart grid the cost parameters can change from hour to hour, there-
fore it is important to study the behaviour of the system under different costs.
In the next experiment we fix n = 100 and the ratios b/c = 1.7 and c/s = 2,
therefore the cost parameters change proportionately. Fig. 5 illustrates that as
the purchasing costs increase, it becomes more important to possess more pre-
cise forecasts. In addition, it can be noted that if the ratio between the cost
parameters is fixed, the Kcbs value is linear in c (see (6)), and thus γ too.
6 Conclusions and Future Works
This paper investigated a mechanism design problem in a setting where several
agents can generate estimates of independent future demands at a cost. An ag-
gregator agent elicits the forecasts and based on this information, optimises a
procurement decision. A novel scoring rule based mechanism has been developed
which is incentive compatible, efficient, individually rational and ex ante budget
balanced, contrary to prior works in this field. Furthermore, the proposed mech-
anism respects privacy, since forecasts and sensitive consumption data have to be
known only by the affected home agent and the aggregator. Several simulation
runs confirmed that even a small group of agents can significantly increase their
utility by forming such a mechanism compared to purchasing directly from the
market. Further on, a relatively small group can achieve almost as much benefit
as a larger one.
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A practical extension of the presented model is when each agent has different
αi values. In this case calculating the optimal forecast precisions leads to a non-
linear optimisation problem with n variables. Consequently, it may be necessary
to apply different γi parameters for the home agents, and for this purpose, the
αi parameters have to be common knowledge. From (18) with an arbitrary γ
these parameters can be calculated as αi = γ(σ
∗
i )
3, thus cost information can be
elicited after an initial step. However, the above derivation is only a sketch and
needs further analysis.
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